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NSA, State, DIA reviews completed

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Requirements for the Collection of Intelligence Information

1. A critical element of the intelligence process and one which has been baffling CIA over the years has been the establishment and levying of requirements in a systematic and discriminating manner.
2. It cannot be said that the problem is satisfactorily solved; it probably never will be. However, in the last 15 years tremendous strides have been made in solving this problem. Interestingly enough, the most fruitful attacks on the problem have been on requirements for those collection systems which are most expensive, most hazardous (and therefore sensitive), and most productive. These are in the fields of clandestine collection, SIGINT collection, and collection by overhead reconnaissance.
3. In each of these cases there has been an increased concentration of effort and discrimination to insure that the requirements levied on them are susceptible of collection by the best means with a minimum of duplication. History shows that the systems have been highly complementary in their productivity, which has forced an examination of all sources in determining specific requirements.
4. The foregoing has had its effect upon the requirements levied on other collection methods. Thus the emergence of the U-2 provoked

a redirection of the effort of the Clandestine Services, and the requirements to be levied on them since many requirements could be much more promptly and completely met by photography.

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5. Of great importance is the effort of the Board to sharply focus on critical collection problems through one of its committees. The purpose has been to define sharply what assets can be usefully energized to close significant intelligence gaps on pressing intelligence estimates and problems.

6. Coordination has greatly improved in insuring that the Agency's needs are given proper attention in the community's determination of requirements for major collection systems. The Collection Guidance Staff attached to the office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence has provided a useful focus in this regard.

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7. A new study of the requirements problem is necessary. We do believe that the maintenance of strong requirements mechanisms of the USIB for requirements is essential. The application of cost-effectiveness techniques and systems evaluation will impinge upon the requirements process. They will cause increased affect not discriminate in definition of requirements for collection. They will also have great impact upon the selection of new collection devices within the three major systems--human resources, SIGINT, and overhead reconnaissance.

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28 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Planning Group  
SUBJECT: Charter for Planning Group

1. Please mark the charter written by [ ] "PG-D-33".  
Attached is an alternate suggestion for the charter of the Planning Group  
prepared by [ ] recommend it  
in lieu of the [ ] draft. In discussing this in the context of [ ]  
charter, they felt that the detailed discussion of how it would work and  
the type of planning officer required were unnecessary for the following  
reasons:

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a. The organization proposed in the Executive  
Director-Comptroller's office is very small, with the  
representation from the other offices. This itself insures  
that a great deal of work could not be accomplished  
separately from the Directorates by the Planning Officer  
alone.

b. Though we agree with the description of the  
type of person required for the head of the planning effort,  
such factors, we feel, would almost certainly be taken into  
account in the selection of this individual anyway.

c. The way in which the Planning Staff will  
operate is something which the new Planning Staff must  
determine for itself with whatever direction it may receive  
from higher authority.

d. Although we feel this new instrument is very  
important, this message is well achieved by the present  
Planning Group's report. If this is not so the effort to make  
the point separately will almost certainly fail.

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e. Finally, we feel that the planning function must be allowed to grow and to find its way gradually. It is important not to generate too elaborate expectations against which its work in this relatively uncharted area will be measured. The establishment of the State Department Planning Staff was surrounded by expectations for its future much greater than were possible of fulfillment. This hurt rather than helped its development.

  
Executive Secretary

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CIA PLANNING STAFF CHARTER

I. Purpose and Responsibilities

A. A Planning Staff has been established to provide assistance, advice, and recommendations to the Executive Director-Comptroller concerning the Agency's plans and programs.

B. The Planning Staff will:

1. Prepare, coordinate, and maintain an Agency Long Range Plan;

2. Review and prepare recommendations with regard to major programs and activities of the Agency as they relate to the fulfillment of long range plans;

3. Maintain current knowledge of and recommend the application of advanced management systems and techniques within the Agency, such as Systems Analysis and Automatic Data Processing and Evaluation; and

4. Recommend the establishment of as well as coordinate and monitor task groups to study selected intelligence problems and programs involving two or more directorates.

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II. Organization and Composition

- A. The Director of the Planning Staff will be assisted by a full-time executive secretary with necessary clerical support.
- B. Two representatives will be appointed from each Directorate and one representative from the Office of Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower to serve on the Planning Staff.
- C. As necessary, and as approved by the Executive Director-Comptroller, specialists in areas such as ADP and Systems Analysis will be assigned full or part time to the Planning Staff.

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
Reference Services

1. The information services referred to herein are:

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a)


b)



c) the Central Reference Service, including the procurement and translation of foreign documents. Each service is established by charter as a service of common concern. (See Monographs III A and V B).

2. The Agency's long range objectives are:

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c) for the Central Reference Service

i) to complete as a matter of urgency the conversion of document retrieval and the reference service to an all source computer operation.

ii) to apply the revolutionary advances and the potential for the management of information to the end of user controlled storage and retrieval.

iii) to test the Automatic Language Processing (ALP) system for machine-aided translations and stenotype production, as part of the responsibility of the Foreign Documents Division.

3. Discussion:

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
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c) The Central Reference Service is already launched in a long range program of information management and is fully alert to the necessity for electronic automation and the integration of its service into the rapidly evolving means for satisfying the demands of the intelligence analyst faced with the oncoming flood of data.

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*Reference Service PG-D-3.2*  
*Information Service*

*Title:*

Information Services

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(The Information Services referred to are: [redacted])


[redacted] the Central Reference Service.

1. The Agency's long range objectives are:

c) for the Central Reference Service

i) to complete <sup>as a matter of urgency</sup> the conversion of document  
retrieval and the reference service to an all  
source computer operation by 1970.

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ii) to apply the revolutionary advances and the potential for the management of information to the end of user controlled storage and retrieval, <sup>e</sup>~~(answer priority information requests within 30 minutes by 1970 and 10 minutes by 1980; routine requests within 4 hours by 1970 and 2 hours by 1980).~~

*Insert*  
*iii) [see below p. 6]*

2. Discussion:

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c) The Central Reference Service is already launched in a long range program of information management and is fully alert to the necessity for electronic automation and the integration of its service into the rapidly evolving means for satisfying the demands of the intelligence analyst faced with the oncoming flood of data.


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4. ~~The~~ <sup>Collection Guidance</sup> ~~Collection Guidance Staff~~. The scope of the staff includes all collection systems, and thus goes far beyond the services mentioned above. The objective of the Collection Guidance Staff is to provide a central means for the long term as well as the crash Consolidation and review of requirements for information. For the evaluation of them in the light of priority national intelligence objectives and the economical assignment of them to the means for collection which is best suited to the end desired, everything considered. It is clear that efficient management of resources requires the achievement of this objective, utilizing all possible advantages to be gained from computers for complete review both in quick response and in anticipations for planning.

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5. Recommendations:

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6. (see recommendations for ADP).

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(Refer above p. 2)

iii) to test the Automatic Language Processing (ALP) system for machine-aided translations and stenotype production, as part of the responsibility of the Foreign Documents Division.

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PG-D-31

26 August 1965

MEDICAL VIEWS ON PLANNING AND HUMAN RESOURCES

I. CONSERVATION OF MANPOWER

The Agency is still in its first generation. Its founders are more than likely its planners. Twenty years have passed since the original founding. It must be conceded that the final phases of a 15-year plan will be left to others to accomplish.

While the second generation eagerly awaits its destiny, the Agency's best interests would be served if it could conserve its existing manpower.

It is not too soon to begin such action. The early effects of aging and stress are becoming evident in our people. The private awareness of physical change is a matter of daily discussion and communication. Medical findings confirm these observations.

At the same time, the Agency is subject to new and increasing pressures. The Agency is no longer in a rapidly expanding phase. The need to do more with less involves abrasive decisions. However, the climate of intelligence activities has become even more competitive and the risk of activities more threatening.

The continuing size of the burden and the limitations of our human resources, both imposed and acquired, indicate a strong need for the conservation of manpower. This may be accomplished in many ways.

A significant contribution can be made by the Office of Medical Services. The current trend to refine and increase the scope of diagnostic capabilities will result in the earlier detection of disease. The current slow expansion of examination capabilities can be accelerated to provide for a greater percentage of executive evaluations. Either or both of these developments will result in earlier referrals to specialists and private physicians.

In a major sense, however, the conservation of manpower is everyone's business. It is certainly the business of the employee and it is certainly in the interest of the supervisor. Hopefully, both supervisor and employee can become increasingly conscious of the need to conserve manpower.

Practical expressions of such attitudes could be expressed in the taking of needed annual leave, the avoidance of unrealistic deadlines, the use of sick leave when illness so dictates, and the avoidance of questionable overtime. There are other more complex manifestations that go beyond the scope of this paper. The Office of Medical Services plans to contribute to the conservation of manpower through appropriate educational efforts.

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## II. CONTRIBUTIONS TO PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

The quality of performance of the Agency's first generation is fairly well known. The evidence is present in history and in the current status of the Agency and its accomplishments.

It is worthy of note that the bulk of Agency staffing has come about in response to exigencies. Original staffing stemmed from predecessor organizations born of war. The subsequent growth of the Agency for many years reflected the periodic threats and eruptions of international tensions. Even the pattern of recent growth, while technological in nature, is in response to exigencies representing threats of the greatest destruction.

The Agency was formed by people not necessarily born into the craft of intelligence or the atmosphere of clandestinity. Rather, the Agency obtained people from many walks of life and from many services. Their common attribute seemed to be the motivation to accomplish the Agency's mission.

The second generation has been acquired in different fashion. The Agency has gone about seeking deliberately for the young candidates of future leadership. Such individuals have been selected after the most careful screening and evaluation. They experience prolonged periods of training and apprenticeship. It is only after extensive indoctrination that responsibilities of service are required.

How effective these methods are remains to be seen. The history of the second generation is yet to be written. In the ordinary course of events, the evidence will only become available after the heritage of responsibility has passed from present hands.

While it seems that the Agency is on the right track in its restaffing methods, the contrast between early and recent patterns of staffing remains evident. Perhaps the difference makes no difference; perhaps it is an advantage. We would be more comfortable if we actually knew.

To be sure the quality of on-duty performance is recorded periodically and evaluations are obtained in relationship to personnel actions. These measures are helpful and provide a degree of estimate and guidance for the future. Additional measures are possible, however, and worthy of exploration.

One such measure would be to link performance evaluations and selection procedures. At the present time, selection procedures have no organized or programmed method available to compare the qualities of actual performances with the findings of selection. There is no feed-back system. Such a system is needed to correct and improve selection methods. A second measure would be to use the linkage between selection procedures

and performance evaluations to assist in guidance systems. The wealth of information that is obtained and is available as a result of selection mechanisms could make a significant contribution to measuring the quality of current performances and in suggesting some avenues and techniques for improvement.

A third measure could be to provide for the periodicity of application of these newer procedures. This periodicity might well vary in time and application according to the needs of career development systems. In general, such procedures would be applied only on those occasions and in those instances when total scrutiny would profit a career service or assist in the management of individuals.

At the present time, the Office of Medical Services is considering the implications of linking selection and evaluation procedures and will be presenting the subject with recommendations to the Deputy Director for Support.

There is a second major area of possible development that is worthy of mention. It seems feasible for behavioral disciplines to provide managers and supervisors with insights into human behavior. While good managers are generally good students of human nature, their natural abilities could be augmented by technical understandings.

This is by no means a new idea. Many management courses provide for such experiences in their curriculum. The effects are generally short-lived due to the isolated nature of the experience.

More recently, the idea has found expression in universities where the faculty has been joined by behavioral disciplines to assist in the formative process that results in education.

In this Agency, with its needs to know about human nature, it seems desirable that a similar relationship be attempted.

The Office of Medical Services will be taking the initiative to provide training and consultative opportunities to management within reasonable limitations.

The foregoing concepts and plans provide one approach to the subject of improving personnel maintenance and development systems. There is a great deal of interest and energy available in the Agency in regard the subject. It is possible that this approach may link up with other efforts and contribute to the goal of building a system of personnel management that equals and relates to the system of personnel selection.



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26 August 1965

### LONG RANGE PLAN

(National Photographic Interpretation Center, NPIC)

1. It is not for the temporary planning group to enter into the pros and cons of NPIC's projected increases in funds and manpower which were submitted with its long range plan. The practical problems have been and are under separate studies, and recommendations for the short term are already in process through command channels.

2. The problem of NPIC deeply impressed the temporary planning group, who saw it as the prize if not overwhelming example of the information explosion which is venting through technical advances and which promises to burst into the intelligence system when the capabilities for satellite reconnaissance come into fuller use within the duration of this plan. It was for this reason that the planning group saw the accelerating technological revolution in its application to the collection of data as the overshadowing problem for long range planning. The group turned to meet it with a correlative and urgent emphasis on the application of the same revolution to the problems and opportunities created by it, viz., by research on the process of

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intelligence itself, automatic data processing, and systems analysis with its inherent potential for control and balance, beginning at the all-important point of requirements or intelligence objectives. (See Monographs ).

3. It was noted that the projections submitted by NPIC for the first five years of the long range plan accounted for approximately  of the increases projected for the Agency as a whole. It was the view of the planning group that such increases for NPIC might well become mandatory if CIA's leading role in this centralized service is to be held and if the problem presented by NPIC is not met soon enough by the Agency's own systems analysis and program control.

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4. The development of overhead reconnaissance - the huge investment in it and the incalculable value of the results from it - together with the advancing potential of this kind and system of collection warrant comparison with the development of communications intelligence during and after World War II. By analogy, CIA through NPIC should be thought of as having the opportunity now and for the foreseeable future to become for satellite reconnaissance

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what NSA belatedly became for communications intelligence.

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5. If the Agency is to maintain its proper role and if a proliferation of duplicating centers for interpretation is to be prevented, then CIA must provide a Center which is responsive and satisfactory to the military services as well as to its own needs. The key lies in superior research and development for successful automation, given the funds to make this possible on a basis of advancing technology.

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(NPIC)

6. Recommendations:

- a. That the Board instruct COMOR to take into account the effect of requirements on NPIC;
- b. That urgent attention be given to the employment of research and development to meet the anticipated problems facing NPIC;
- c. That the Agency engage in intensified efforts in the training of photo interpreters.

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6. It is recommended that the Director arrange with the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the appropriation of funds for NPIC is consistent with that for the National Reconnaissance Organization to the end that the capabilities of each are in balance to meet the requirements of the intelligence community as determined by the USIB and the DCI as its chairman.

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## THE CIA IMAGE

1. The Central Intelligence Agency has been concerned about its image to the world, and most particularly to the United States, ever since its creation. Overseas, the Agency image is important to the work of the CIA operations ~~abroad~~. In fact, it may seriously affect ~~THE AGENCY'S~~ their ability to work with the noncommitted and underdeveloped countries. These are influenced to a considerable degree by what is said in the American press and also by the world press, which in turn can be affected by Communist propaganda and operations of the Disinformation Bureau of the Soviet intelligence service. Therefore, in planning for the future, the image of CIA plays an important role.

2. From a point of view of an organization containing a clandestine service, it would be ideal if the name or the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency were never mentioned in the public media. This, however, is impractical, particularly in a free society with freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the right of the people to know what their Government is doing. Therefore, the development of the image of the Central Intelligence Agency must proceed on a practical basis. It may take many years before it even approximates what would be considered a satisfactory image in a free society. It will take effort

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on the part of the Agency, and this effort cannot be allocated or assigned to any one unit but must be shared by all senior officers from the Director down.

3. Relations with the press or representatives of the public media is only one aspect of developing a correct image, although an important one. The Agency has learned by sad experience that if information concerning its work is available, publicity is inevitable. It would be a mistake if the Agency tried to fight this as the results in the past have always indicated that the effort is counterproductive.

4. Perhaps even more important in developing the public image are the Agency's relations with the rest of the United States Government. This obviously includes the Executive Branch of the Government, and especially the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Security Advisor to the President, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, members of the Cabinet and chiefs of independent agencies with which CIA has dealings. We believe that the Agency should

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have a concerted and carefully worked out briefing schedule for these officials which should be designed to educate them as to both the capabilities and limitations of the Agency and as to the utility of intelligence. This has never been done in the past, and the Agency has suffered for it.

5. Intelligence is only as good as the use which is made of it, and if the policy makers are not aware of the value of intelligence or how to use it, the country will suffer. While it is hard to generalize in this area, it can be said that policy makers' reaction to intelligence will range all the way from those who ignore it completely to those who use it effectively. The objective should be the development of a system wherein the policy maker will know when to use intelligence and be aware of the assistance which it can give him in his job. The goal should be a system in which the President and his principal advisors periodically receive directly from the Director of Central Intelligence--and nobody else--briefings on the world situation and on the critical areas of the moment. If this could be arranged on a regular basis, the entire process of Government in the field of American security affairs would prosper. This is a process of education to achieve this objective, but it should be one of the major objectives of the Agency for the future.

6. Second only to the President and the principal policy makers of the Executive Branch is the importance of a good CIA image

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with the United States Congress. While it is probably true that CIA has as good a reputation with the Congress today as any Government department or agency, we believe it could still be better, and that it should not rely exclusively on the efforts of the Director. There should be added emphasis on briefing members of both the House and the Senate at a "secret" level on Agency activities, and we should take advantage of the very large number of the members of the Congress who are personal friends of Agency officials. It should be an objective to have most of the Senate and a good proportion of the House better acquainted with the Agency and with the intelligence process.

7. Another very important area for the development of the Agency image is the academic world, for it is primarily in this field that we recruit the bulk of the career trainees of the Agency and seek assistance in research. The 100 Universities Program over recent years has made considerable progress in developing a better understanding in the academic world of the Central Intelligence Agency, and we believe this can be expanded and improved, and would urge concentrated and systematic efforts in this regard.

8. Finally, there is the business world in which the Agency's image is important, and we have the mandate of the President to brief

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businessmen both on the work of the Agency and on areas abroad of interest to their organizations. This program has progressed but is still on a very modest scale and should be expanded.

9. The Central Intelligence Agency should not overlook the fact that it has considerable interface with the American public which affects its image. [REDACTED]

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recruiters of the Office of Personnel and the investigators in the Office of Security (both DD/S) have [REDACTED] left favorable impressions in their activities, and the same is true of Agency personnel dealing with contractors. In all instances, however, these people need <sup>more</sup> and ~~prompter~~ guidance from Headquarters at times when the Agency is in the headlines such as the Bay of Pigs, the U-2 incident, etc. Constructive, intelligent comment to a confidential contact is often better than silence which is often interpreted as admission. Finally, Agency personnel are often known as such in the communities where they live. When these people are public spirited, participate in community affairs and are generally regarded as good citizens, the Agency benefits.

10. The CIA has already acquired a formidable body of alumni who are active in the business and academic worlds. Several times the Agency has studied making use of these people to assist it. Each time

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the formidable security problems associated with a formal alumni association have resulted in no action. [REDACTED]

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11. If all of the above activities are undertaken, and it is recommended that they be undertaken, the image of the Agency will steadily improve and it is demonstrable that, with the passage of time, it will become a widely known and accepted organization to the American public, and even to the world.

Recommendations:

a. That the Agency intensify its briefings on its organization, objectives and mission to appropriate members of the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government;

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c. That a program for better use of Agency alumni be developed.

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## THE CIA IMAGE

1. The Central Intelligence Agency has been concerned about its image to the world, and most particularly to the United States, ever since its creation. Overseas, the CIA image is important to the work of the Clandestine Services. In fact, it may seriously affect their ability to work with the noncommitted and underdeveloped countries which are always influenced to a considerable degree by what is said in the American press and also by the world press, which in turn can be affected by Communist propaganda and operations of the Disinformation Bureau of the Soviet intelligence service. Therefore, in planning for the future, the image of CIA plays an important role.
2. From a purely theoretical point of view, it would be ideal if the name or the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency were never mentioned in the public media. This, however, is impractical, particularly in a free society with freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the right of the people to know what their Government is doing. Therefore the development of the image of the Central Intelligence Agency must proceed on a practical basis. It will not be created overnight. It is a long-term proposition. It may take many years before it even approximates what would be considered a satisfactory image in a free society. It will

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take effort on the part of the Agency, and this effort cannot be allocated or assigned to any one unit but must be shared by all senior officers from the Director down.

3. Relations with the press or representatives of the public media is only one aspect of developing a correct image, although an important one. The Agency has learned by sad experience that if information concerning its work is available, publicity is inevitable. It would be a mistake if the Agency tried to fight this as the results in the past have always indicated that the effort is counterproductive. While the Agency cannot and should not attempt to enlighten the press concerning its activities, it can cultivate a favorable impression with the press by selective substantive briefings, particularly in areas where it is very well qualified, such as Communist parties, hostile intelligence activities, etc. where the release of the information would have no damaging effect.

4. Perhaps even more important in developing the public image are the Agency's relations with the rest of the United States Government. This obviously included the Executive Branch of the Government, and especially the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Security Advisor to the President, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, members of the Cabinet and chiefs of independent agencies with which CIA has dealings. We believe that the Agency should

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have a concerted and carefully worked out briefing schedule for these officials which should be designed to educate them as to both the capabilities and limitations of the Agency and as to the utility of intelligence. This has never been done in the past, and the Agency has suffered for it.

5. Intelligence is only as good as the use which is made of it, and if the policy makers are not aware of the value of intelligence or how to use it, the country will suffer. While it is hard to generalize in this area, it can be said that policy makers' reaction to intelligence will range all the way from those who ignore it completely to those who use it effectively. The objective should be the development of a system wherein the policy maker will know when to use intelligence and be aware of the assistance which it can give him in his job. The goal should be a system in which the President and his principal advisors periodically receive directly from the Director of Central Intelligence--and nobody else--briefings on the world situation and on the critical areas of the moment. If this could be arranged on a regular basis, the entire process of Government in the field of American security affairs would prosper. This is a process of education to achieve this objective, but it should be one of the major objectives of the Agency for the future.

6. Second only to the President and the principal policy makers of the Executive Branch is the importance of a good CIA image

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with the United States Congress. While it is probably true that CIA has as good a reputation with the Congress today as any Government department or agency, we believe it could still be better, and that it should not rely exclusively on the efforts of the Director. There should be added emphasis on briefing members of both the House and the Senate at a "secret" level on Agency activities, and we should take advantage of the very large number of the members of the Congress who are personal friends of Agency officials. It should be an objective to have most of the Senate and a good proportion of the House better acquainted with the Agency and with the intelligence process.

7. Another very important area for the development of the Agency image is the academic world, for it is primarily in this field that we recruit the bulk of the career trainees of the Agency and seek assistance in research. The 100 Universities Program over recent years has made considerable progress in developing a better understanding in the academic world of the Central Intelligence Agency, and we believe this can be expanded and improved, and would urge concentrated and systematic efforts in this regard.

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9. If all of the above activities are undertaken, and it is recommended that they be undertaken, the image of the Agency will steadily improve and it is demonstrable that, with the passage of time, it will become a widely known and accepted organization to the American public, and even to the world.

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25 August 65

LONG-RANGE PLAN  
SUPPORT DIRECTORATE

I Objectives

The long-range plan of the Support Directorate has the following objectives:

- A. Improved planning which will provide support properly attuned to the Agency's increasingly sophisticated and growing activities.
- B. Redirection of the Agency's support programs in order to assure the flexibility and competence required by rapidly evolving technology, the continuing development of new major foreign problems, and the "information explosion."

II Personnel Strength

The plans of the other Agency Directorates for the next five years contemplates sizeable increases in numbers of personnel. The Plans Directorate anticipates a growth [ ] The Intelligence Directorate plans increases within [ ] NPIC. NPIC stands out by itself. Its planned increase is [ ] additional positions. The Directorate

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25X1 of Science and Technology, during the same period, envisages an addition of  
25X1 [ ] positions. If these increases are approved, the Support Directorate will  
25X1 require approximately [ ] positions in order to keep the Agency's support  
25X1 resources in balance. Thus, a five year growth of CIA, [ ]  
25X1 would presume an average increase in strength [ ] annually. The prospect  
of accommodating by 1970 such a large increase in personnel strength requires  
immediate action now for the acquisition of space and other supporting facilities  
to accommodate such growth.

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### III Medical Views on Planning and Human Resources

The Office of Medical Services in its planning activities directs Agency attention to the increasing incidence of medical problems in Agency personnel and the corresponding need to conserve manpower. Medical Office action contemplates a broader application of increased diagnostic facilities and an educational program to insure managerial awareness.

In addition, the Office of Medical Services suggests that selection procedures and performance evaluations may be joined together in a system that contributes to better personnel management. The Medical Office is studying the subject and will be making representations to the Deputy Director for Support. In regard personnel management, the Office of Medical Services also intends to provide educational opportunities for management to gain increased understanding of human behavior.

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IV Senior Officer Training

A. The present CIA Senior Officer Group is comprised of individuals of approximately the same age, many of whom will become eligible for retirement at the same time. The succeeding generation of executives will have insufficient chance to prepare themselves for executive responsibilities unless corrective measures are taken.

B. The Agency has made commendable progress in the training of young professionals and mid-careerists. We need now to take the next step--the inauguration of a Senior Officers' training course designed to prepare mid-careerists for the assumption of senior executive responsibilities. The creation of an Executive Career Service, including all senior Agency officials other than specialists, and who possess executive qualifications of a flexible character, would appear to be a logical outgrowth of this program. These individuals could be subject to rotational assignments throughout the Agency and across Directorate lines. An Executive Career Service could provide a source of talent trained in breadth. In time, such executives could be rotated to senior positions throughout the Foreign Intelligence Community as is the case on a limited scale today. This would tend to promote better understanding.

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V Training Policies and Methods

A. The demand for scarce categories of skills in photo interpretation, science and technology, research, and automation has been and will continue to be in excess of the available supply from external sources. A considerable emphasis in the Agency's training efforts must be made if we are to cope with this problem. Our long-range efforts, then, should focus on the following:

1. The establishment of a training reserve so that the manpower to be trained can be spared from the mounting pressures of today's work requirements.
2. The selection and reassignment of more professionals from the Agency's senior ranks for the purpose of training and developing younger personnel.
3. Development of new methods of instruction (program learning) which will increase the training effort and at the same time provide for uniformly high quality.
4. Development of a greater language capability tailored to cover increased emphasis on China, Africa, and Latin America. The Agency must take steps now to develop

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a strong and meaningful language training policy if its capability in this field is to advance with the changing world situation.

VI Development of Support Executives

Inherent in the Support Directorate long-range program is the development to the highest degree of management expertise in all fields of support activity. The program already underway contemplates a development cadre of young support professionals who will be trained in all of the support functional fields, both domestically and overseas, over a long-range period. This effort would be directed at official and nonofficial support requirements. From this group, support executives, capable of the broad-gauge judgment which will be required in years ahead, should emerge.

VII Security

A. The Agency's long-range security program will require greater emphasis in the technical security field and in the industrial security program in order to assure the protection of Agency interests.

B. Automatic data processing techniques are now being developed to cope with the increasing volumes of security transactions and the increased cohesiveness of security relationships in the Federal

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Intelligence Community. Elsewhere within our security structure modern technology in the fields of physical security, polygraphing, and technical security will upgrade our protective measures.

VIII Communications

Planning for the Agency's future communications support includes:

- A. The increased use of automated equipment to expedite the flow of traffic and improve efficiency.
- B. An expanded technical capability to improve Agency posture in communications security and other technical fields.
- C. An increased number of Base radio stations designed to ensure an increased Agency communications capability, including alternate facilities for dealing with crisis situations.
- D. Improved facilities for secure voice, data, and facsimile communications.
- E. Improved Agent communications gear offering greater security, flexibility, and speed.

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F. The increase in speed of Agency telecommunications is somewhat negated by the Agency's outmoded system of handling other forms of communications; i.e., dispatches, memoranda, and messenger systems. In most cases the originator selects the means of transmitting the message. The proliferation of registries through which written communications wend their way negates the over-all goal of faster communications. A thorough-going systems analysis of Agency communications methods and practices is desirable.

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22 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Planning Group  
SUBJECT: Support Summary

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Attached is the Support Summary submitted

It may be worth considering this possibly as it might be expanded to embrace our monographs on Personnel and Training, Security, and Communications.

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Executive Secretary

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LONG-RANGE PLAN  
SUPPORT DIRECTORATE

1. The long-range plan of the Support Directorate has the following objectives:

a. Improved requirements planning which will provide support properly attuned to the Agency's increasingly sophisticated and growing activities.

b. Redirection of the Agency's support programs in order to assure the flexibility and competence required by rapidly evolving technology, the continuing development of new major foreign problems, and the "information explosion."

2. The plans of the other Agency Directorates for the next five years contemplate sizeable increases in numbers of personnel. The Plans

25X1 Directorate anticipates a growth [ ] positions. The Intelligence

25X1 Directorate plans increases within [ ] positions.

25X1 The largest area of growth within the Intelligence Directorate is planned for NPIC [ ] additional positions. The Directorate of Science and

25X1 Technology, during the same period, envisages an addition [ ] positions.

If these increases are approved, the Support Directorate will require

25X1 [ ] positions in order to keep the Agency's support

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resources in balance. Thus, a five year growth of CIA, totaling [ ] people, would presume an average increase in strength [ ] annually. The prospect of accommodating by 1970 such a large increase in personnel strength requires immediate action now for the acquisition of space and other supporting facilities to accommodate such growth.

3. The increasing complexity and rising workload commitments of CIA place a burden upon its personnel at a time when its first generation is aging. These new and increasing pressures will require managerial efforts at all echelons designed to conserve manpower. Our plans envisage a closing of the gap between the Agency's medical program and managerial practices in the hope of bringing into full focus total periodic evaluations of employees rather than supervisory performance evaluations alone.

4. The present CIA Senior Officer Group is comprised of individuals of approximately the same age, many of whom will become eligible for retirement at the same time. The succeeding generation of executives will have insufficient chance to prepare themselves for executive responsibilities unless corrective measures are taken.

5. The Agency has made commendable progress in the training of young professionals and mid-careerists. We need now to take the next

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step--the inauguration of a Senior Officers' training course designed to prepare mid-careerists for the assumption of senior executive responsibilities. The creation of an Executive Career Service, including all senior Agency officials other than specialists, and who possess executive qualifications of a flexible character, would appear to be a logical outgrowth of this program. These individuals could be subject to rotational assignments throughout the Agency and across Directorate lines. An Executive Career Service could provide a source of talent trained in breadth. In time, such executives could be rotated to senior positions throughout the Foreign Intelligence Community as is the case on a limited scale today. This would tend to promote better understanding.

6. The demand for scarce categories of skills in photo interpretation, science and technology, research, and automation has been and will continue to be in excess of the available supply from external sources. A considerable emphasis in the Agency's training efforts must be made if we are to cope with this problem. Our long-range efforts, then, should focus on the following:

- a. The establishment of a training reserve so that the manpower to be trained can be spared from the mounting pressures of today's work requirements.

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b. The selection and reassignment of more professionals from the Agency's senior ranks for the purpose of training and developing younger personnel.

c. Development of new methods of instruction (program learning) which will increase the training effort and at the same time provide for uniformly high quality.

d. Development of a greater language capability tailored to cover increased emphasis on China and Latin America. The Agency must take steps now to develop a strong and meaningful language training policy if its capability in this field is to advance with the changing world situation.

7. Inherent in the Support Directorate long-range program is the development to the highest degree of management expertise in all fields of support activity. The program already under way contemplates a development cadre of young support professionals who will be trained in all of the support functional fields, both domestically and overseas, over a long-range period. This effort would be directed at official and non-official support requirements. From this group, support executives, capable of the broad-gauge judgment which will be required in years ahead, should emerge.

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8. The Agency's long-range security program will require greater emphasis in the technical security field and in the industrial security program in order to assure the protection of Agency interests.

9. Automatic data processing techniques are now being developed to cope with the increasing volumes of security transactions and the increased cohesiveness of security relationships in the Federal Intelligence Community. Elsewhere within our security structure modern technology in the fields of physical security, polygraphing, and technical security will upgrade our protective measures.

10. Planning for the Agency's future communications support includes:

- a. The increased use of automated equipment to expedite the flow of traffic and improve efficiency.
- b. An expanded technical capability to improve Agency posture in communications security and other technical fields.
- c. An increased number of Base radio stations designed to ensure an increased Agency communications capability, including alternate facilities for dealing with crisis situations.

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d. Improved facilities for secure voice, data, and facsimile communications.

e. Improved Agent communications gear offering greater security, flexibility, and speed.

11. The increase in speed of Agency telecommunications is somewhat negated by the Agency's outmoded system of handling other forms of communications; i. e., dispatches, memoranda, and messenger systems. In most cases the originator selects the means of transmitting the message. The proliferation of registries through which written communications wend their way negates the over-all goal of faster communications. A thorough-going systems analysis of Agency communications methods and practices is desirable.

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26 August 1965

OVER VIEW FOR THE CIA LONG-RANGE PLAN

I. In a few short years the Central Intelligence Agency has developed the resources, techniques, and expertise which has enabled it to carry out its unique responsibilities rapidly and responsibly. This has been affirmed and reaffirmed by four Presidents and the overwhelming majority of responsible officials of government. Nonetheless, the Central Intelligence Agency is not immune to the technological revolution, the rapid explosion in communications, and the burgeoning unrest which characterizes the world today. These rapidly evolving changes have special implications to intelligence which must be heeded if we are to meet the challenges of the future.

II. The technological revolution has provided intelligence with a wealth of new information largely pertaining to the capabilities of other nations, and means have been and continue to be developed for its exploitation and analysis. However as yet, adequate sources and techniques have not been provided for determining the intentions of potentially hostile nations. The numbers of intelligence consumers and their demands for intelligence in greater detail have increased in a measure which was unforeseen when the concept of strategic intelligence was

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first formulated. Over the years the range of intelligence has also broadened to encompass the total spectrum of today's conflict - economic, social, and psychological as well as military and political. Concurrently, there has been an increased demand, which will not diminish, for "instant intelligence" vital for early warning of all types. Perhaps the most significant recent change in intelligence concerns the processing and analysis of information. For many years and for good reason, intelligence was primarily concerned with means of collecting information of all kinds. It is abundantly clear at this time that our ability to process and analyze raw information has not kept pace with our collection capability.

III. During the past few weeks the Planning Group has examined the future of the Central Intelligence Agency and presents what it believes to be a sound and rational plan for the future. This plan identifies and develops those themes which are of utmost importance to the future posture of the Agency. It is important to point out what this plan is not. It is not a simple compilation of Directorate views. It is not a pitch for more of everything or a dreary recitation of our problems.

IV. The Planning Group is deeply concerned by the difficulties facing NPIC which is faced with an overload of photographic data without the resources for proper analysis. How-

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ever, the Planning Group recognizes the NPIC problem as a dramatic example of a general phenomenon within the community which we call "information indigestion." Information indigestion is also apparent in many other analytical offices in the Agency and applies to our early warning capability, signal analysis, and other basic intelligence activities. Therefore, the plan highlights the critical need for a high priority and aggressive program aimed at increased use of automatic data processing and more sophisticated techniques for data analysis. The annexes do, however, give indications of the programs which must be undertaken to solve the NPIC as well as other related data analysis problems.

V. The increased demands for national intelligence not only dictate the need for more rapid communication of information collected by technical means but serve to underline the unique contribution which the clandestine services provide with respect to intentions. Broader dissemination of clandestinely obtained information requires more rigorous control of the source of this valuable information if the clandestine services are to play an increasingly effective role in intelligence.

VI. The Planning Group found that there were certain common problems which could be identified. The commonality of problems became more apparent in the course of our briefings and discussions. A second finding was that the plan to antici-

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pate and improve the operations of the Agency does not involve proportionately large increases in personnel or funds but indicates a reduction of our efforts toward these common problems.

VII. A plan must consider its existing resources and functions and in recommending new programs must consider what can be removed from current efforts in order to provide the resources necessary to meet new challenges. There is no question that each and every office or division within the Agency could find certain on-going activities which, if curtailed or modified, would provide savings in funds and manpower. However, such economies, no matter how rigorously instituted, would not significantly reduce the budget and manpower requirements of the Agency but would affect the responsibilities of the Agency.

VIII. We are in a paradoxical situation. There is no question that the requirements for intelligence will increase quantitatively and qualitatively. There is also no question that simply adding manpower and personnel under the misguided concept that we can do everything for everybody will prove disastrous. What is clear from the deliberations of the group is that major improvements in the effectiveness of the Agency will be the result of better analysis of the operations of intelligence. Indeed minor changes in services performed, a decision to cut out certain aspects of basic intelligence may

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serve to obscure the real nature of the problem and prove costly in the long run.

IX. Consideration was given to the role of national current intelligence. Those responsible for national intelligence production are concerned about the gradual erosion of their basic capability for strategic intelligence in their effort to serve tactical and current requirements. If it is clear that we must serve both purposes, then it must also be clear that it will cost us in resources. History shows that the overbalance toward current intelligence without adequate support to the basic in-depth research on the capabilities and intentions of our adversaries could be the most dangerous and perhaps fatal error which we could commit.

X. It should be apparent on reading the plan that the overwhelming emphasis of the Planning Group has been on the substantive and operational aspects of intelligence with less discussion regarding organizational and legislative problems which, in any event, will fall in line when a plan is approved.

XI. It probably bears repeating that this plan, like any plan that is worthwhile, is not an end but a beginning.

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PG-D-27/1  
24 August 1965Over View for the CIA Long-Range Plan

1. In a few short years the Central Intelligence Agency has developed the resources, techniques, and expertise which has enabled it to carry out its unique responsibilities rapidly and responsibly. This has been affirmed and reaffirmed by four Presidents and the overwhelming majority of responsible officials of government. Nonetheless, the Central Intelligence Agency is not immune to the technological revolution, the rapid explosion in communications, and the burgeoning unrest which characterizes the world today. These rapidly evolving changes have special implications to intelligence which must be heeded if we are to meet the challenges of the future.

2. The technological revolution has provided intelligence with a wealth of new information largely pertaining to the capabilities of other nations, although it has not as yet provided significant techniques for determining the intentions of potentially hostile nations. The consumers of intelligence have increased at a rapid rate and are demanding detailed information which was unforeseen when the concept of strategic intelligence was first formulated. Over the years the range of intelligence has also broadened to reflect today's spectrum

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of conflict - economic, social, and psychological as well as military and political. Concurrently, there is an increased demand for "instant intelligence" vital for early warning of all types. Perhaps the most significant recent change in intelligence concerns the processing and analysis of information. For many years and for good reason, intelligence has been primarily concerned with means of collecting information of all kinds. It is abundantly clear at this time that our ability to process and analyze raw information has not kept pace with our collection capability.

3. During the past few weeks the Planning Group has examined the future of the Central Intelligence Agency and presents what it believes to be a sound and rational plan for the future. This plan identifies and develops those themes which are of utmost importance to the future posture of the Agency. It is important to point out what this plan is not. It is not a simple compilation of Directorate views. It is not a pitch for more of everything or a dreary recitation of our problems.

4. The Planning Group is deeply concerned by the difficulties facing NPIC which is faced with an overload of photographic data without the resources for proper analysis. However, the Planning Group recognizes the NPIC problem as a dramatic example of a general phenomenon within the community

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which we call "information indigestion." Information indigestion is also apparent in many other analytical offices in the Agency and applies to our early warning capability, signal analysis, and other basic intelligence activities. Therefore, the plan highlights the critical need for a high priority and aggressive program aimed at increased use of automatic data processing and more sophisticated techniques for data analysis. The annexes do, however, give indications of the programs which must be undertaken to solve the NPIC as well as other related data analysis problems.

5. The increased demands for national intelligence not only dictate the need for more rapid communication of information collected by technical means but serve to underline the unique contribution which the clandestine services provide with respect to intentions. Broader dissemination of clandestinely obtained information requires more rigorous control of the source of this valuable information if the clandestine services are to play an increasingly effective role in intelligence.

6. The Planning Group found that there were certain common problems which could be identified. The commonality of problems became more apparent in the course of our briefings and discussions. A second finding was that the plan to anticipate and improve the operations of the Agency does not involve

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proportionately large increases in personnel or funds but indicates a redirection of our efforts toward these common problems.

7. A plan must consider its existing resources and functions and in recommending new programs must consider what can be removed from current efforts in order to provide the resources necessary to meet new challenges. There is no question that each and every office or division within the Agency could find certain on-going activities which, if curtailed or modified, would provide savings in funds and manpower. However, such economies, no matter how rigorously instituted, would not significantly reduce the budget and manpower requirements of the Agency but would affect the responsibilities of the Agency.

8. We are in a paradoxical situation. There is no question that the requirements for intelligence will increase quantitatively and qualitatively. There is also no question that simply adding manpower and personnel under the misguided concept that we can do everything for everybody will prove disastrous. What is clear from the deliberations of the group is that major improvements in the effectiveness of the Agency will be the result of better analysis of the operations of intelligence. Indeed minor changes in services performed, a

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decision to cut out certain aspects of basic intelligence may serve to obscure the real nature of the problem and prove costly in the long run.

9. Consideration was given to the role of national current intelligence. Those responsible for national intelligence production are concerned about the gradual erosion of their basic capability for strategic intelligence in their effort to serve tactical and current requirements. If it is clear that we must serve both purposes, then it must also be clear that it will cost us in resources. History shows that the overbalance toward current intelligence without adequate support to the basic in-depth research on the capabilities and intentions of our adversaries could be the most dangerous and perhaps fatal error which we could commit.

10. It should be apparent on reading the plan that the overwhelming emphasis of the Planning Group has been on the substantive and operational aspects of intelligence with less discussion regarding organizational and legislative problems which, in any event, will fall in line when a plan is approved.

11. It probably bears repeating that this plan, like any plan that is worthwhile, is not an end but a beginning.

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22 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Planning Group

SUBJECT: Over View for the CIA Long-Range Plan

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Attached is [ ] submission under title proposed by

the undersigned who also made a few editorial changes. Since time

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did not permit discussion of certain suggestions with [ ] it

was thought preferable to leave it essentially as submitted for

discussion by the Planning Group.

[ ]  
Chief of Staff

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22 August 1965

Over View for the CIA Long-Range Plan

1. In a few short years the Central Intelligence Agency has developed the resources, techniques, and expertise which has enabled it to carry out its unique responsibilities rapidly and responsibly. This has been affirmed and reaffirmed by four Presidents and the overwhelming majority of responsible officials of government. Nonetheless, the Central Intelligence Agency is not immune to the technological revolution, the rapid explosion in communications, and the burgeoning unrest which characterizes the world today. These rapidly evolving changes have special implications to intelligence which must be heeded if we are to meet the challenges of the future.

2. The technological revolution has provided intelligence with a wealth of new information largely pertaining to the capabilities of other nations, although it has not as yet provided significant techniques for determining the intentions of potentially hostile nations. The consumers of intelligence have increased at a rapid rate and are demanding detailed information which was unforeseen when the concept of strategic intelligence was first formulated. Not only the quantity but the range of intelligence has also broadened to reflect today's spectrum of conflict - economic, social, and psychological as well as military and political. Concurrently,

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there is an increased demand for instant intelligence vital in terms of early warning of all types. Perhaps the most significant change in intelligence during the past few years concerns the analysis of information. For many years and for good reason, intelligence has been primarily concerned with means of collecting information of all kinds. It is abundantly clear at this time that our ability to analyze raw information has not kept pace with our collection capability.

3. During the past few weeks the Planning Group has examined the future of the Central Intelligence Agency and presents what it believes to be a rational roadmap for the future. This plan identifies and develops those themes which are of utmost importance in terms of the future posture of the Agency. It is important to point out what this plan is not. It is not a simple compilation of Directorate views. It is not a pitch for more of everything or a bleating recitation of our problems. By way of explanation, the Planning Group is deeply concerned by the difficulties facing NPIC which is faced with an overload of photographic data without the resources to properly analyze it. However, the Planning Group recognizes the NPIC problem as a dramatic example of a general phenomenon within the Agency resulting from information indigestion. Information indigestion is also apparent in many other analytical offices in the Agency and applies to our

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activities. Therefore, the plan highlights the critical need for a high priority and aggressive program aimed at increased use of automatic data processing and more sophisticated techniques for data analysis. The annexes do, however, give indications of the programs which must be undertaken to solve the NPIC as well as other related data analysis problems.

4. The Planning Group was pleasantly surprised to find that there were certain common problems which could be identified. The commonality of problems became more apparent in the course of our briefings and discussions. A second and equally surprising finding was that the plan to anticipate and improve the operations of the Agency does not involve large increases in personnel or funds but indicates a redirection of our efforts toward these common problems.

5. It is implicit, if not explicit, that a plan must consider its current resources and functions and in recommending new programs must consider what can be removed from current efforts in order to provide the resources necessary to undertake new challenges. Considerable discussion evolved over this point. There is no question that each and every office or division within the Agency could find certain activities

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which it now provided which could be curtailed or stretched with some savings in funds. It would be naive, however, to assume that these economies, no matter how rigorously instituted, would significantly reduce the budget and manpower requirements without affecting the responsibility of the Agency. We are in a paradoxical situation. There is no question that the requirements for intelligence will increase quantitatively and qualitatively. There is also no question that simply adding manpower and personnel under the misguided concept that we can do everything for everybody will prove disastrous. What is clear from the deliberations of the group is that major improvements in the effectiveness of the Agency will be the result of better analysis of the operations of intelligence. Indeed minor changes in services performed, a decision to cut out certain aspects of basic intelligence may serve to obscure the real nature of the problem and prove costly in the long run.

6. A special consideration was given to the role of current intelligence versus national intelligence. Those responsible for national intelligence production are concerned about the gradual erosion of their basic capability for national and strategic intelligence in their effort to serve tactical and current requirements. It is also clear that this is not an either/or problem but one which faces the entire federal government.

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If it is clear that we must serve both purposes, then it must also be clear that it will cost us in resources. History shows that the overbalance toward current intelligence without adequate support to the basic in-depth research on the capabilities and intentions of our adversaries could be the most dangerous and perhaps fatal error which we could commit.

7. It should be apparent on reading the plan that the overwhelming emphasis of the Planning Group has been on the substantive aspects of intelligence with less discussion regarding organizational and legislative problems. The purpose of this Planning Group is to identify the roadmap necessary to improve the function of the Central Intelligence Agency in the world of tomorrow. Organizational and legislative changes should be considered carefully as a follow on to the substantive requirements of this plan.

8. Finally, we recognize that the presentation of the programs in support of the plans and indeed the in-depth discussions of the major big signals of this plan lack a certain continuity of expression. This is purposeful as we were aware of the possibility that tidiness could obscure substance. It probably bears repeating that this plan, like any plan that is worthwhile, is not an end but only a beginning.

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PG-Δ-26

SECRET

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30 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Multiple Addressees Listed on Page 2

SUBJECT: Assumptions for Long-Range Planning

1. In examining non-substantive assumptions as an input to the Long-Range Plan for the CIA, the question arose as to the basis, legal or other, for many of the Agency's activities. A little research revealed that some operations, particularly those which are national in character, are not supported fully by NSCIDs, DCIDs, or other directives. For example, it is assumed that CIA will continue to produce a national current intelligence daily. Where does this authority exist? Does NSCID/3 spell this out precisely enough or are there other directives which provide the legal basis for OCI to produce national current intelligence?

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Is this in NSCIDs, DCIDs, or other directives? We presume the answer to be no. It probably exists in letters of agreement or Bureau of the Budget directives.

2. To assist the Planning Group in determining the legal basis for selected Agency activities, it is requested that you spell out briefly, but precisely, the authority for those activities listed in the attachment which are under your jurisdiction. If the activity or function carries with it a responsibility for interagency coordination, please indicate and state what mechanism is used to achieve this.

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3. This information should be forwarded promptly to [redacted] Executive Secretary, Planning Group, Room 6E1311 Headquarters.

[redacted]  
Chief of Staff  
Planning Group

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25X1

1 Mr. Ashcraft

2

3 Mr. Borel

25X1

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6 Mr. Smith

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8 Dr. Guthe

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10 Mr. Brammell

25X1

11

12

13 Mr. Kent

14

15 Mr. Duckett

25X1

16

17 Mr. Angleton

25X1

18

19

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Central reference services

Central document translation services (FDD)

Current intelligence

Economic intelligence

Geographic intelligence

Basic intelligence

Scientific intelligence

National estimates

FMSAC

Clandestine collection

Counter-intelligence

Technical support to clandestine operations (TSD)

Covert actions general

Paramilitary operations

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*Over - Ashcraft*  
*Economic - Guthe*  
*FMSAC - Duckett*  
*Clandestine - George 2*

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SECRET

16 AUG 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Executive Secretary  
Planning Group  
Room 6E1311, Headquarters

25X1

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

Memorandum of 30 July 1965, Subject: Assumptions  
for Long-Range Planning

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Attached is the listing of, and quotations from, the pertinent

NSCID's and DCID's

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Attachment:

As stated above.

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Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100030001-5

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Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100030001-5

- 3 -

25X1

**III. SUPPORT TO CLANDESTINE SERVICES**

NSCID No. 5 - paragraph 3 a. - "The Central Intelligence Agency... is responsible for the ... conduct of espionage outside the United States and its possessions..."

Specific Functions

1. Assist in spotting and assessing potential agents for the clandestine services

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**IV. CENTRAL INDEX**

Specific Function

1. Maintain a central index of governmental and non-governmental sources

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NSCID No. 2 - paragraph 7 (As quoted above)

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- 4 -

25X1



VI. ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS OF SOVIET MATERIALS

NSCID No. 2 - paragraph 7 (As quoted above)

Specific Function

1. Obtain and arrange for analysis of materials produced in the Soviet Union, Communist China or other communist countries. Disseminate information derived from such analysis.

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5 August 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Executive Secretary, Planning Group


SUBJECT:

Assumptions for Long-Range Planning

REFERENCE:

Memorandum of 30 July 1965 from  
Chief of Staff, Planning Group, Same Subject

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Chief, DO Division

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

25X1

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Mr.   
Executive Secretary, Planning Group

2. Room 6E 1311 Hqs.

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**SECRET**

6 August 1965

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**MEMORANDUM FOR:**

[redacted]  
Executive Secretary, Planning Group

**SUBJECT:**

Assumptions for Long-Range Planning

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**REFERENCE:**

Memo [redacted] to Multiple Addressees  
same subject dated 30 July 1965

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1. In late 1963 [redacted] Mr. Borel moved up to Assistant DDI. As Acting Director of Central Reference I shall therefore answer for the items opposite Mr. Borel's name and my own in reference memo.

**a. Central Reference Services**

Authority: Para. 6.a.(3) of NSCID No. 1 states that "Central reference facilities as a service of common concern shall be provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and/or other departments and agencies as appropriate."


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**c. Exploitation of Foreign Publications**

Authority: Para. 9 of NSCID 2 states "The Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct the exploitation of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes, as appropriate, as a service of common concern. DCID 2/4 implements the above."

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- 2 -

**d. Coordination**

Formal coordination of the above activities is accomplished through the USIB Committee on Documentation (CODIB). Frequent working-level liaison effects day-to-day coordination.

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[redacted]  
Acting Director of Central Reference

cc: [redacted]

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9 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, Planning Group

SUBJECT : Authorities for OCI Activity

REFERENCE :  Memorandum dated 30 July 1965

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1. NSCID 3, Para. 2b, reads as follows:

"The Central Intelligence Agency and the several departments and agencies shall produce and disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet their own internal requirements. Normally, the current intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency is produced primarily to meet the needs of the President and National Security Council; in addition it serves the common needs of the interested departments and agencies of the Government for current intelligence which they themselves do not produce."

2. This language provides the basic authority for OCI's current intelligence activities. It should be noted, however, that there is a fundamental contradiction in the term national current intelligence. National intelligence is fully coordinated; current intelligence often cannot be coordinated and remain current. Thus NSCID #3 is worded to authorize CIA to produce current intelligence at the national level.

3. Within the very broad authority of NSCID 3, the only OCI product for which there is a specific juridical basis is the Central Intelligence Bulletin. A series of IAC discussions in late 1957 and 1958 (IAC-M-319, 3 December 57; IAC-D-321, 17 December 57; IAC-M-323, 7 January 58) culminated in Presidential

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approval of CIA's plan for production of a revised Bulletin which would be coordinated with State and the service agencies to the extent that timeliness would permit. (NSC Action 1833). In 1964 USIB reviewed and revalidated the IAC's decisions, including the coordination procedures (USIB-D-23.4/1, 24 February 64; USIB-M-316, 11 March 1964). Under these procedures, each afternoon the draft Bulletin for the following morning is coordinated by a CIA-State-DIA panel. Changes on the basis of late information are then made unilaterally by CIA.

4. No such specific authorities exist for OCI's other current intelligence output. The bulk of it has developed from a series of oral instructions from the DCI, or in some cases from the White House. For instance, the only written authority for production of the President's Daily Brief is a memorandum from Major General Chester V. Clifton, then Military Aide to President Kennedy, telling Secretaries Rusk and McNamara that the Brief (then the Checklist) existed and informing them that the President wanted them to read it.

  
Assistant for Special Projects  
Current Intelligence

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RL:yd(6Aug65)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee  
1 - ASP/CI

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5 August 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [ ] Chief of Staff, Planning Group

SUBJECT: Legal and Other Bases for Conduct of Economic and Military-Economic Intelligence by ORR/CIA

25X1

REFERENCE: Memo from [ ] Chief of Staff, Planning Group, Subject: Assumptions for Long-Range Planning, 30 July 1965

1. In response to your request to provide brief and precise authority for activities undertaken in ORR and categorized by you under the general heading "Economic Intelligence," I am providing you with the following statements.

2. Economic Intelligence


a. Economic Intelligence on Communist Countries

NSCID No. 3 under paragraph 7.c. states that "The Central Intelligence Agency shall produce economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc ... as a service of common concern."

DCID No. 3/1 under paragraph 2.a. states that regarding the "general delineation of primary responsibilities for the production of economic intelligence of common concern: ... (3) Production of all economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc is the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency except as indicated herein. In addition, it will supplement the intelligence produced by other agencies by conducting such analyses and studies as may be necessary to produce integrated economic intelligence on the Bloc."

It is generally recognized within the intelligence community that references to the Sino-Soviet Bloc in Directives are currently interpreted as referring to Communist countries and to the economic activities (military and economic aid, and trade) of Communist countries in the Free World when the Directives relate to economic intelligence.

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**b. Economic Intelligence on Free World Countries**

In a letter of 11 March 1965 from the DCI to the Secretary of State, the appropriateness of ORR producing economic intelligence on Free World countries is clearly set forth. In this letter the DCI states that DCID No. 3/1 "provides that each department or agency ... shall maintain adequate research facilities to accomplish its departmental intelligence production mission, and ... may make such studies as it believes necessary to supplement intelligence produced by other departments and agencies." He says further that he has "found it necessary to develop within CIA a limited capability for all-source economic analyses on non-Communist countries...." [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The Agency's responsibility to produce, at the national level, timely all-source economic intelligence on current developments in non-Communist areas precludes, as a practical matter, our relying wholly on the other intelligence components of the community." He said that he "must maintain within the Agency the capability of obtaining immediate all-source economic intelligence bearing on critical national policy questions...." He closed by noting that he considered "DCID No. 3/1 properly interpretable as permissive of these intelligence production activities." Furthermore, the NIS Committee allocated to ORR/CIA the responsibility for producing the Section 6 of the NIS General Surveys for the Free World countries.

**c. Coordination of Economic Intelligence**

DCID No. 3/1 in paragraph 3 specifies that "To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out his responsibilities with respect to coordination, the EIC [Economic Intelligence Committee] of the Intelligence Board shall" perform various functions, and goes on to specify that "The representative from the Central Intelligence Agency shall serve as Chairman, and the Central Intelligence Agency shall provide the Secretariat."

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### 3. Military-Economic Intelligence

#### a. Military-Economic Intelligence Production

The analysis of economic aspects of foreign military production, weapons deployment, and broad military programs has been recognized for years as part of the general economic intelligence mission of ORR. Although in delineating primary responsibilities for production of intelligence in NSCID No. 3 and DCID No. 3/1 production of military and military-economic intelligence is generally assigned to the Department of Defense, ORR/CIA, following the intent of DCID No. 3/1, has found it necessary to undertake studies in these fields believed necessary to supplement intelligence produced elsewhere in order to provide essential contributions to military National Intelligence Estimates, and to provide the support required by the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out his responsibilities.

In recognition of ORR's role in the field of foreign military expenditures, Deputy Defense Secretary Vance, in a letter of 5 February 1965 to the DCI regarding "... studies relating to cost and resource impact of foreign military and space programs ...," stated that he wholeheartedly concurred "that the Central Intelligence Agency should continue to have primary responsibility for these analyses; ..." and he supported "the expansion of the Central Intelligence Agency's capabilities in this area." The DCI agreed, and the Bureau of the Budget authorized positions to augment ORR's work in this area of priority interest.



#### b. Coordination of Military-Economic Intelligence

ORR is represented on the GMAIC and two of its Working Groups and is an observer at JAEIC meetings. The Office has been providing the co-chairman for the CIA/DIA Soviet Ground Forces Panel and is represented on several other groups in which foreign military matters are discussed.

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OTTO E. GUINE  
Director  
Research and Reports

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12 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, Planning Group

SUBJECT: Basis for Geographic and Basic Intelligence Activities

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Chief of Staff, Planning Group, subject: Assumptions for Long-Range Planning, dated 30 July 1965

1. Basic intelligence activities as organized under the National Intelligence Survey Program are conducted under authority specified in NSCID No. 3 (revised 18 January 1961), paragraphs 1a, b, c, d, and e. Further modifications are detailed in USIB-D-51.1/8, 28 August 1963. Interagency coordination of the NIS Program is stated in paragraphs 8-11 of the USIB document referred to above. The NIS Committee assists the USIB in carrying out its responsibilities.

2. This Agency's basic intelligence activities other than NIS -- but including geographic research, cartography, and map library services -- are conducted to meet our departmental requirements and do not have a legal basis support such as NSCID's, DCID's, or other directives of that character.

3. The transfer of the parent activity (geographic research) to CIG in 1947 is covered by a joint agreement between the Department of State and CIG signed in August 1947. (Copy attached)

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4. Cartographic support and Map Library support activities and responsibilities are detailed in [ ] respectively. The mission and functions of the Office of Basic Intelligence are contained in [ ] (revised, but not yet published).

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
5. Two intelligence-mapping programs, one on the USSR and the other on Communist China, are conducted jointly by OBI and DoD and were established by interdepartmental exchanges of letters as follows: USSR -- letter, DDI/CIA to ACSI, 4 November 1960, and ACSI reply, 10 November 1960; China -- letter, Chief, Geographic Research/CIA to AD for Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy, DIA, 16 March 1965, and DIA reply, 22 July 1965. The DIA reply also recorded DIA's assumption of ACSI's former role in the joint USSR intelligence-mapping program.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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(signed)  
JAMES A. BRAMMELL

JAMES A. BRAMMELL  
Director of Basic Intelligence

Enclosure:  
Joint State-CIG Agreement

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DD/ST# 3628-65

10 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Planning Group

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ATTENTION:

SUBJECT: Legal Basis for OSI Activities

REFERENCE: Your Memo, "Assumptions for Long-Range Planning", 30 July 1965


1. The authority for OSI's activities in the production and coordination of scientific intelligence stem from NSCID 3 (revised 18 January 1961) and the DCIDs derived from it (3/3, 3/4, and 3/5). The substantive and procedural guidance documents that pertain are DCIDs 1/2, 1/3, and 1/6. These references are explained more explicitly below.

2. The pertinent citations in NSCID 3 are contained in paragraph 7c ("The CIA shall produce.....scientific and technical intelligence as a service of common concern") and 7d on atomic energy intelligence.

3. The relevant implementing DCIDs are 3/3 "Production of Atomic Energy Intelligence", 3/4 "Production of Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence", and 3/5 "Production of Scientific and Technical Intelligence". The latter DCID reiterates the service of common concern role for CIA as expressed in NSCID 3 and authorizes such production as required to fulfill the statutory responsibilities of the DCI. These are key concepts in the development of OSI's position in the community through the years. These DCIDs establish JAEIC, GMAIC and SIC, respectively. It should be noted that the chairmen of JAEIC and SIC have without exception been officials of OSI.

4. Substantive guidance, if not authority, stems from DCID 1/3 "Priority National Intelligence Objectives" and the quarterly supplements thereto.

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**SUBJECT: Legal Basis for OSI Activities**

5. The remaining directive of concern in this connection is 1/6 "Control of Initial Information Regarding Foreign Nuclear Explosions". This directive establishes the role of the Chairman, JAEIC in the disclosure and control of information of this type.

  
Deputy Director of  
Scientific Intelligence

**Distribution**

Orig. and 1 - Addressee  
1 - Exec. Officer DD/S&T  
2 - DD/SI  
1 - IPS/SI

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OSI/DD/

 (9 August 1965)

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25 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Action Officer, DD/S&T


SUBJECT: Legal Basis for OSI Activities

REFERENCE: 10 August 1965 Memorandum to Planning Group  
from DD/SI, Legal Basis for OSI Activities

1. As requested in your phone call of 24 August, the following paragraph on OSI's legal basis is submitted for inclusion in the appropriate Long Range Planning monograph. In essence, it is a rewording of the reference memorandum.

Responsibility for the Agency's production of finished intelligence on all foreign scientific and technical activities rests with the Office of Scientific Intelligence under the authority of National Security Council Intelligence Directive #3 and Director of Central Intelligence Directives 3/3 for atomic energy, 3/4 for guided missiles and astronautics, and 3/5 for other scientific and technical intelligence. The pertinent citations in NSCID 3 are contained in paragraph 7c ("the CIA shall produce .... scientific and technical intelligence as a service of common concern") and 7d on atomic energy intelligence. DCID 3/3 and 3/4 both state in paragraph 2 that the production of intelligence on atomic energy and guided missiles and astronautics is the responsibility of all departments and agencies represented on the USIB. Paragraph 2.a. of DCID 3/5 reiterates paragraph 7c of NSCID 3 that the CIA shall produce scientific and technical intelligence as a service of common concern "and as required to fulfill the statutory responsibilities of the DCI." Thus OSI produces intelligence in nearly every phase of foreign

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**SUBJECT: Legal Basis for OSI Activities**

military research and development consistent with  
its manpower capabilities and external research  
facilities.

2. If this paragraph does not meet your requirements,  
please call me.



Chief, IPS/SI

**Distribution:**

Orig & 1 - Addressee  
2 - C/IPS


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OSI:IPS:  (24 Aug 65)

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9 August 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

 Executive Secretary  
Planning Group  
Room 6E1311, Headquarters

SUBJECT



: Authority for Production  
Of National Intelligence Estimates

Authority for the production of National Intelligence Estimates is generally in NSCID/1 and NSCID/3, and specifically in DCID No. 1/1. This DCID also sets forth in detail the mechanism which is used for the interagency coordination of National Intelligence Estimates.

ABBOT SMITH  
Acting Director  
National Estimates

~~SECRET~~

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FMSAC 333-65

19 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, Planning Group

SUBJECT : Assumptions for Long-Range Planning

REFERENCE : Your Memo, same subject, 30 July 65

25X1 1. A review of all the background documents pertaining to the formation of FMSAC reveals that the only stated authority for its existence is the National Security Act of 1947 which charges the Central Intelligence Agency with the responsibility to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and to provide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government. This basis was cited in a memorandum for the Deputy Director of CIA dated 21 October 1963 and signed by John A. McCone, then the DCI. In a series of correspondence with DOD during late 1963 and early 1964 this same basis for establishing FMSAC was cited by the Director several times. For example, in a memorandum for Dr. Fubini and [redacted] dated 4 March 1964 the Director stated that FMSAC was required to meet his statutory responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947 and quoted the same portion of the Act as that above.

2. During verbal discussions regarding the establishment of this organization the Bureau of the Budget suggested that either a NSCID or DCID be issued which clearly stated responsibilities of FMSAC. Mr. McCone expressed the view that his authority to form such an organization was clear and he felt there was no need for any supporting legal documents, thus no further action was taken.

CARL E. DUCKETT

Director

Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center

☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100030001-5

☐ INTERNAL  
USE ONLY

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

D/FMSAC

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

20 Aug 65

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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# MEMORANDUM

1. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5, revision dated 21 April 1958, entitled: "U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad". /This Directive was originally issued on 12 December 1947 under the title: "Espionage and Counterespionage Operations". The 1958 revision -- still in force -- was a thoroughgoing overhaul of the paper./

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3. McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act, 27 June 1952 (PL 414, 82nd Cong.; 66 Stat 163-282), sections 105, 290 (b).

4. The DCI by letter exchanges has agreed to participate in interagency coordination on certain points of U.S. internal security interest. The mechanism is the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), chaired by the Department of Justice. CIA participates on an ad hoc basis in two ICIS working groups.

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11 August 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR :   
Executive Secretary,  
Planning Group

SUBJECT : Assumptions for Long Range Planning

REFERENCE : Memorandum From: Chief of Staff,  
Planning Group, dated 30 July 1965;  
Same Subject

In compliance with Paragraph 2, Reference, the following comment regarding existing legal authority for Technical Services Division's activities is forwarded as requested:

The Technical Services Division exists primarily to support the Clandestine Services in executing its activities as directed by NSCID/5. The mission and specific functions of the Technical Services Division are as directed by the DDP

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AC/TSD/

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UNCLASSIFIED

Approved

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USE ONLY

Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP76B00952R000100030001-5



CONFIDENTIAL



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SUBJECT: (Optional)

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2. C/TSD

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Executive Secretary,  
Planning Group

Attn: ☐

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			DATE 4 August 1965	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. DDP Long Range Plans Officer 25X1				To 1: Please pull your file copy before forwarding to No. 3.
2.				
3. Executive Secretary 25X1 Planning Group				
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PG-D-24/2

26 August 1965

CIA'S ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION

I. Introduction

A. Under the terms of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for recommending to the National Security Council "the coordination of such intelligence activities of the Government as relate to national security" and "to perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."

B. The Central Intelligence Agency has numerous assigned responsibilities for coordination. These coordinating responsibilities are derivative of the role of the Director of Central Intelligence in coordination of the community and in almost all cases explicitly defined either in National Security Council Intelligence Directives, Director of Central Intelligence Directives (as more definitive expansions of the former), or instructions from higher authority. In some cases they stem from agreements not yet located in such documents.

II. Coordination of Intelligence Production

A. National Intelligence Estimates. Authority for the production of National Intelligence Estimates is referred to in NSCID 1 and NSCID 3 and specifically outlined in D 1/1. The Deputy Director for Intelligence

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through the Office of National Estimates (ONE) provides all services in support of the production of NIEs. The Assistant Director, Office of National Estimates, is Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (BNE). ONE provides a staff of analysts which prepare and coordinate with USIB agencies all terms of reference for proposed NIEs and review, synthesize and write final draft estimates for presentation to the BNE. The Agency also provides all printing, binding and distribution services connected with the production of NIEs.

B. Current Intelligence. The basic authority for CIA's role in current intelligence activities stems from para 2b of NSCID 3. Beginning in the early 1950's, the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), pursuant to an IAC (later USIB) decision, initiated a procedure whereby each daily publication of the Current Intelligence Bulletin was coordinated by an IAC panel. The need for this procedure was confirmed in CIA-DIA discussion of 1964 and was continued as a coordination mechanism for the Central Intelligence Bulletin. OCI provides all service required for the production of coordinated current intelligence which includes a large analytical group, an Operation Center, and all necessary graphic art, reproduction, registry and distribution facilities. This is a 24-hour, 7-day a week coordination job. It is desirable that the assignment for this coordination be officially specified in a DCID.

C. Scientific and Technical Intelligence. In addition to the responsibility stemming from NSCID 3 and DCIDs 3/3 and 3/4 for the production

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of scientific and technical intelligence, the CIA's coordinating role principally stems from the Chairman, USIB's appointment of CIA officers as the Chairman of the Board's committees on atomic energy, guided missiles, and scientific intelligence. The Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee of USIB carries a specific responsibility

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Science and Technology provides services in support of these three committees and all support services concerned with producing national scientific and technical intelligence.

D. Economic Intelligence. The Office of Research and Reports (ORR), DD/I, produces economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc pursuant to NSCID 3 and DCID 3/1. The Assistant Director, ORR, is Chairman of USIB's Economic Intelligence Committee which coordinates community economic intelligence programs related to DCID 3/1. Additionally, ORR produces essential military-economic <sup>intelligence</sup> in support of National Estimates and to meet intelligence needs of the Defense Department. ORR provides the co-chairman of the CIA/DIA Soviet Ground Forces Panel.

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E. Basic Intelligence. The Agency has a major responsibility in the coordination of basic intelligence activities through the National Intelligence Survey program specified in NSCID 3. The Office of Basic Intelligence (OBI),

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DD/I, coordinates the scheduling, review, editing, production and distribution of the NIS program for the Intelligence Community.

### III. Coordination of Clandestine Services and Functions

A. NSCID 5 establishes on the DCI the responsibility for coordination of those clandestine activities of the armed services in the interest of their departmental missions. The DDP in general is responsible through the station chiefs in the field and through the FI Staff in headquarters for carrying out this responsibility in Washington. This has devolved on the DIA, with the participation of the AF, the Navy and the Army in direct relationship with the FI Staff of the DDP.

B. The FI Staff is also responsible for such coordination of clandestine intelligence activities abroad as is necessary with the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.

C. The CA Staff of the DDP is responsible for coordination of all matters growing out of NSCID 5412 with the same office of the Department of State. All area division chiefs are responsible for coordination of covert political activities with the various Assistant Secretaries of State for their pertinent areas.

D. The CI Staff is responsible for coordination of all DDP matters that relate to the interest of the FBI. The CI Staff is responsible for coordination with the Office of Security, Department of State, certain DDP related counterintelligence matters. The CI Staff is also responsible for coordination of matters involving the safety of the President with the Secret Service.

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E. The DDP War Plans Staff coordinates its DDP War Plans and intelligence requirements with the JCS in support of military planning both in Washington and in the field.

F. The DDP Special Operations Division coordinates CIA paramilitary responsibilities and needs, primarily air, with the JCS.

G. It should be held in mind that coordination with the White House Staff, the 303 Committee and the Special Group-Counter Insurgency, as well as with certain other concerned departments at responsible levels is carried on by the DDP himself, by the Assistant DDP and in some instances by the chiefs of the FI, CI and CA Staffs.

IV. Coordination of Overt Collection Activities

A. In carrying out its responsibility for a selective exploitation with the United States non-Governmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence under NSCID 2, the Agency is responsible for providing coordination as necessary with the community.

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V. Reference Services

The Office of Central Reference (OCR), DD/I, carries out several services in pursuance of directives. Under NSCID 1, OCR provides reference facilities of common concern as appropriate. Under DCID 1/9, OCR

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Under NSCID 2, OCR provides for the central procurement and exploitation of foreign language publications. Formal coordination of the above activities is accomplished through the USIB Committee on Documentation (CODIB), which is chaired by CIA. These central reference services are a major element of CIA's coordination responsibilities and involve the maintenance of large staffs to provide the required registering, coding, indexing, evaluation, report preparation and distribution of materials to other intelligence agencies.

VI. Security

A. The Office of Security (OS), DD/S, has several coordinating responsibilities which derive from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and in support of the Central Intelligence Agency. CIA provides the Chairman

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of the USIB Security Committee which was established pursuant to DCID 1/11. The Security Committee is responsible for recommending to USIB standards, practices and procedures for intelligence security and security policy. The Committee also is responsible for damage assessments of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods and for coordinating with all USIB agencies and committees having related security responsibilities.

B. The Office of Security is the primary Agency element in the investigation, study and preparation of recommendations associated with the DCI's responsibility for the protection of sources and methods. In this regard, OS is the official Agency contact in coordinating CIA's security program with other Government departments and agencies and in ensuring that the security policies and procedures of the DCI, CIA and USIB are followed.

C. OS provides advice and support to the National Reconnaissance Organization's security program and a range of supporting security services.

D. OS also is responsible for servicing the requests of other Government agencies for information and services connected with personnel security clearances and for liaison and coordination with state and local police departments.

E. In the audio surveillance field, the Office of Security provides teams of experts and the equipment required for security "sweeps" of US installations abroad and provides recommendations and advice to other Government agencies concerning audio countermeasures.

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F. In view of the above it can be seen that a large part of the manpower and resources of CIA's Office of Security is devoted to performing services of common concern to the Government and to carrying out the DCI's and USIB's security responsibilities, rather than solely to maintaining CIA's security program.

#### VII. Training

The Office of Training (OT), DD/S, is not charged (in NSCIDs or DCIDs) with responsibilities for providing services of common concern or with coordinating the training programs of other agencies. In fact, however, the Office of Training and other Agency elements frequently provide courses, instructors and facilities for the training of personnel from USIB and other agencies. OTR also serves as a central reference facility in the provision of materials, services and advice to other Government intelligence agencies and often develops intelligence training programs applicable to several USIB agencies.

#### VIII. Communications

The Office of Communications (OC), DD/S, provides extensive secure communications support

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OC also provides to other Government agencies in accordance with Clandestine Services security policies and approvals, specialized communications equipment for use in intelligence and military operations. The Director of the Office of Communications serves on the United States Communications Security Board.

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**IX. Other Specialized Coordination Services**

**A. Overhead Reconnaissance and Photo Interpretation.**

1. CIA provides the Chairman of the USIB Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), established under DCID 2/7, and an extensive central system for the control and referencing of all overhead reconnaissance targets required for support of COMOR's coordinating mission.

2. Under NSCID 8, CIA provides a National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) to provide preliminary interpretations of photographs to the Community, to provide and disseminate photographic interpretation reports in support of the national intelligence effort and to furnish additional related support to the Community. The Agency through the NPIC consults with other intelligence agencies in the coordination of photographic interpretation requirements and priorities and provides all material support and services required to operate the NPIC.


B. The Watch Committee. Pursuant to DCID 1/5, the indications and warning responsibilities of the Director and the Board are coordinated through the Watch Committee of the Board chaired by a senior Agency official. The Staff of the Watch Committee, known as the National Indications Center, is headed by a CIA official.

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S E C R E T

PG-D-24/1

20 August 1965

Coordination of the U. S. National Foreign Intelligence Effort

Summary

Coordination of the national foreign intelligence effort will continue to be an essential part of the DCF's responsibility and will grow in importance and urgency. Those coordinating responsibilities assigned to CIA, explicitly or implicitly, will continue in effect. Pressures to erode these responsibilities can be resisted successfully.

Despite certain basic obstacles, progress has been made in coordination, using a number of existing mechanisms. Continuing effort will be devoted to sustaining and developing the best possible means of defining and dealing with coordination problems. Organizational arrangements will vary depending on a number of circumstances.

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S E C R E T

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20 August 1965

Discussion

Coordination of the U. S. National Foreign Intelligence Effort

The statutory authority for coordination of the U. S. national foreign intelligence effort is contained in the National Security Act of 1947. This provides that the Central Intelligence Agency shall correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies. This Act also gives the Agency the responsibility for performing services of common concern and of advising the National Security Council and making recommendations to it for coordination of national intelligence activities.

Later the National Security Council, in NSCID No. 1, placed the coordinating responsibility on the Director of Central Intelligence as an individual. NSCID 1 states that "the DCI shall coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the United States . . . ." In addition, this document establishes the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) under the chairmanship of the DCI, to assist in maintaining a fully coordinated intelligence community and providing for integration and guidance to the national intelligence effort. This first NSCID and later ones further define the authority of the DCI and of CIA, as well as of other agencies, in specific intelligence areas.

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The Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID's), implementing the NSCID's, assign to CIA, either implicitly or explicitly, coordination responsibilities in many fields. In some the assignment is implicit, in that coordinating authority is given to the DCI's representative or that CIA is directed to perform certain services of common concern.

25X1 In other cases [ ] procurement of foreign language publications) coordinating authority is specifically given to the Agency. Appendix A lists areas of such specific authority.

The DCI's coordinating role was further strengthened by President Kennedy's letter to Mr. McCone of January 16, 1962. This letter contains the first official description of the DCI as "the government's principal foreign intelligence officer." He was directed to undertake coordination and effective guidance of the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort and to ensure the proper "coordination, correlation and evaluation of intelligence from all sources . . . ." The letter instructs the DCI to delegate detailed direction of the CIA to his Deputy, in order to permit him to concentrate on his "primary task" of coordination. He was told to "maintain a continuing review of the programs and activities of all U. S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence . . . with a view toward assuring efficiency and effectiveness and to avoiding undesirable duplication."

From the beginning the DCI has been under pressure to assert vigorously his authorities in the area of coordination. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) has made numerous written



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and oral recommendations directed toward this end. These have included a recurring recommendation that the Director should disassociate himself physically from the CIA in order to carry out this phase of his responsibilities more effectively. No incumbent of the office of the DCI has agreed to go this far but various organizational changes have been effected with the objective of strengthening the Director's capabilities in this respect. These have included the appointment of a Deputy for Coordination [ ] [ ] the establishment of a Coordination Staff and most recently, in September 1963, the designation of a Deputy and a small staff for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE).

Numerous problems have arisen in the exercise of the Director's coordinating responsibilities. The size and complexity of the U. S. intelligence effort has increased enormously in recent years, particularly with respect to new and highly expensive collection systems. These developments have further emphasized the need for constructive coordination and evaluation and at the same time have made this much more difficult. Not the least of the difficulties is the fact that a very high percentage of the assets of the intelligence community, in terms of money, men and materials, is controlled by agencies not under the command of the DCI. Therefore, effective exercise of his responsibilities and authorities inevitably conflicts with established command relationships. Thus the DCI cannot, for example, direct the Secretary of Defense to make changes in a collection program which may appear to involve undesirable duplication; he can only attempt to persuade and guide.

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Nonetheless, a considerable amount of progress has been made in the past two years. A few examples are: (a) organizational improvements in the USIB and some of its principal committees, and increasing effectiveness of the Board in its coordinating capacity; (b) a detailed review of SIGINT requirements throughout the community, to determine and define the needs of the community; (c) participation of representatives of the DCI in the DOD review of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program; (d) participation with DOD officials in review of the Consolidated Intelligence Program; (e) reorganization of the management of the National Reconnaissance Program, with particular emphasis on assuring its responsiveness to intelligence requirements; (f) improved coordination by the DCI through the DD/P of the clandestine operations of the military services; (g) and a sizeable number of other activities in organizational, management and substantive areas.

A great deal remains to be done. Inevitably, personalities and particular styles of management will affect the extent to which any DCI will exercise his coordinating responsibilities, and the manner in which he does so. There is not now, and probably will not be in the near future, an institutionalized procedure for assuring that all major aspects of national intelligence programs are subjected to proper coordination and review. It is axiomatic, however, that more rather than less coordination will be required, and that pressures from policy-making areas of the government will continue to be brought to bear on the DCI to exercise strong leadership

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S E C R E T

in this field. It cannot be entirely clear at this time whether the eventual mechanisms for assisting the DCI will consist of a small highly specialized staff, calling for assistance on all elements of the CIA; a somewhat larger staff with more expertise in depth; some kind of element specifically charged with the management of intelligence resources; or some still different organizational entity, or a combination of one or several. What is clear is that this function will continue to be an essential part of the DCI's responsibility and almost certainly will grow in importance and urgency.

The coordinating roles assigned to CIA itself will undoubtedly remain essentially unchanged. It is difficult to imagine that they will be explicitly increased to any significant degree. On the other hand, it can be anticipated that, particularly as agencies in the military intelligence field gain strength and experience, there will be increasing pressures to erode the Agency's coordinating role, at least in practice. These pressures should and can be resisted successfully.

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(Appendix on coordination assignments will be distributed 23 August 1965.)

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Appendix A

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Functional Areas in Which CIA Has Explicit Coordinating Responsibilities

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2. Exploitation of foreign language publications (DCID 2/4).

3. Procurement of foreign publications (DCID 2/5).

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NOTE: The DCID's in the 5 series (espionage and counterintelligence) present a special case. These directives assign specific coordinating responsibilities to the DCI or to his designated representatives. In

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17 August 1965

Coordination of the U. S. National Foreign Intelligence Effort

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A great deal remains to be done. Inevitably, personalities and particular styles of management will affect the extent to which any DCI will exercise his coordinating responsibilities, and the manner in which he does so. There is not now, and probably will not be in the near future, an institutionalized procedure for assuring that all major aspects of national intelligence programs are subjected to proper coordination and review. It is axiomatic, however, that more rather than less coordination will be required, and that pressures from policy-making areas of the government will continue to be brought to bear on the DCI to exercise strong leadership in this field. It cannot be entirely clear at this time whether the eventual mechanisms for assisting the DCI will consist of a small highly specialized staff, calling for assistance on all elements of the CIA; a somewhat larger staff with more expertise in depth; some kind of interagency committee for management of intelligence resources; or some still different organizational entity, or a combination of one or several. What is clear is that this function will continue to be an essential part of the DCI's responsibility and almost certainly will grow in importance and urgency.



MEDICAL VIEWS ON PLANNING AND HUMAN RESOURCES

I

As a guidepost for the future, it seems safe to assume that the biological cycle of the human organism will remain unaltered. To be sure, it is expected that medical sciences will achieve new successes. Disease processes will be better understood and managed. Medical care will become more readily available. Medical techniques will reflect the expertise of associated technologies. But all of these advances will only assist in facilitating the life cycle; not in changing its basic characteristics.

Some advancement may also be expected in the understanding of human behavior. It seems unlikely, though, that the nature of the human race will change a great deal or that there will suddenly develop an affinity in human relationships.

In short, the world of human beings as we know it is not about to change in character from our current and past experiences.

Actually, no one seriously considers that the human race will change very much in the next 15 years. In fact, the bulk of Agency planning automatically includes options for action to deal with the vagaries and immutability of the nature of mankind.

In a planning exercise, it may be helpful to identify these unvoiced and unwritten assumptions. Certainly, such assumptions may be of value when we consider our own human resources.

II

It is most natural for us, as we plan, to think in terms of what we, the people of the Agency, intend to do in the future. In a sense, we project our own personal wishes through the vehicle of an Agency abstraction. Vicariously, for a while, we live in the future.

But, as we are also a part of mankind, it gradually occurs to us that not we, but someone else, will live out future expectations.

The Agency is still in its first generation. Its founders are more than likely its planners. Twenty years have passed since the original founding. It must be conceded that the final phases of a 15-year plan will be left to others to accomplish.

While the second generation eagerly awaits its destiny, the Agency's best interests would be served if it could conserve its existing manpower.

It is not too soon to begin such action. The early effects of aging and stress are becoming evident in our people. The private awareness of physical change is a matter of daily discussion and communication. Medical findings confirm these observations.

At the same time, the Agency is subject to new and increasing pressures. The Agency is no longer in a rapidly expanding phase. The need to do more with less involves abrasive decisions. However, the climate of intelligence activities has become even more competitive and the risk of activities more threatening.

The continuing size of the burden and the limitations of our human resources, both imposed and acquired, indicate a strong need for the conservation of manpower. While this may be accomplished in many ways, managerial recognition of the need is considered essential. The objective would be to use manpower as the Agency's most valuable commodity. While such action would not interrupt the biological cycle, it would slow and not accelerate the process.

### III

The quality of performance of the Agency's first generation is fairly well known. The evidence is present in history and in the current status of the Agency and its accomplishments.

It is worthy of note that the bulk of Agency staffing has come about in response to exigencies. Original staffing stemmed from predecessor organizations born of war. The subsequent growth of the Agency for many years reflected the periodic threats and eruptions of international tensions. Even the pattern of recent growth, while technological in nature, is in response to exigencies representing threats of the greatest destruction.

The Agency was formed by people not necessarily born into the craft of intelligence or the atmosphere of clandestinity. Rather, the Agency obtained people from many walks of life and from many services. Their common attribute seemed to be the motivation to accomplish the Agency's mission.

The second generation has been acquired in different fashion. The Agency has gone about seeking deliberately for the young candidates of future leadership. Such individuals have been selected after the most careful screening and evaluation. They experience prolonged periods of training and apprenticeship. It is only after extensive indoctrination that responsibilities for service are required.

How effective these methods are remains to be seen. The history of the second generation is yet to be written. In the ordinary course of

events, the evidence will only become available after the heritage of responsibility has passed from present hands.

While it seems that the Agency is on the right track in its restaffing methods, the contrast between early and recent patterns of staffing remains evident. Perhaps the difference makes no difference; perhaps it is an advantage. We would be more comfortable if we actually knew.

It would be helpful if an on-duty counterpart to our detailed selection system existed. To be sure, the quality of on-duty performance is recorded periodically and evaluations are obtained in relationship to personnel actions. However, there is a need to link performance with selection and to employ new measurements that recognize and apply to the continuum of people and individuals. The goal would be to build a system of personnel management that equals and relates to the system of personnel selection.

#### IV

For a host of reasons, most of them imperative, human ingenuity is focused on the external environment. The focus has resulted in technological developments that multiply energy and the capacity to do work.

The harnessing of nature's forces has had multiple effects. For the human race, there would appear to be a partial promise of a better way of life. There are other implications, however.

Some of the new developments threaten life processes in new and different ways. The result has been a renewed interest in such fundamentals as the composition of the atmosphere, the availability of water, the increase in populations. The idea is beginning to emerge that environmental mastery is not enough; the effects on the biological cycle must also be considered.

It is becoming apparent that the human capacity for adaptation has limitations. This feature has not been too apparent in the past when technological capabilities did not exceed the seemingly endless capacity of the human organism to adapt. However, new technologies provide more visual stimuli than the eye can see, more sound than the ear can hear, more information than the mind can comprehend, and even more food than can be comfortably eaten.

While preoccupation with external environment must necessarily continue, the human factor will have to be better weighed, better measured, and better understood.

The human factor promises to be a subject of increasing interest in the business of intelligence. In a sense, it has always been a subject of interest, especially in clandestine foreign intelligence collection. However, in terms of its own human resources, the Agency can be given more requirements than it can fill, receive more information than it can use, and distribute more reports than can be effectively read. The Agency will need to strike a measured balance between its technological capabilities and human capacity. Such balance implies a closer welding of human resources to methods of production.

While it is not anticipated, as previously stated, that human nature will change in the foreseeable future, insights into behavior are due to increase. As they become available, it would be helpful if the Agency applied such knowledge to its human relationships.

V

Finally, planning for the future enhances the quality of our existing resources.

More than a few people of the Agency can recall the early tenuous days when the future of the Agency was less certain. Today, we are engaged in considering what pathways an established organization should follow. The sense of perspective that accompanies the planning exercise unlocks energies for further development.

  
JOHN R. TIETJEN, M. D.  
Director of Medical Services

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SECURITY PROBLEMS - LONG RANGE PLANNING

The Office of Security is constantly striving to improve security in all of its fields. Technical developments, sociological change, and possible realignment of international forces will require changes in our security techniques and procedures. These unique problems must be met with a high degree of sophistication in the security field. Some of the future problems can be identified by manifestations appearing at this time. Others cannot. Accordingly, this paper will address itself to future security problems which are either with us at the present time and will continue to be problems, or those which can be anticipated with some degree of certainty.

I. Investigations and Operational Support

- A. As a result of recent writings on the "invasion of privacy" there has developed a noticeable reluctance on the part of persons interviewed during the course of investigations to furnish information about, or even identify, the persons known to them who are being investigated. This reluctance has also manifested itself in the refusal by some university officials to make available documents and information pertinent to personnel security investigations. It is contemplated that this will be a continuing problem which will become even more pronounced in future years. These circumstances will require the development of new investigative techniques and additional sources of information. In this regard, the Office of Security has a senior officer working on a classified book on this subject. This is being done in collaboration with the Brookings Institute through the medium of a one year fellowship.

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## II. Physical Security

- A. The physical protection of CIA installations and personnel abroad will be a continuing problem. The prominent power position of the U. S. will continue to subject its overseas personnel to increased numbers of demonstrations, riots, or acts of violence together with their attendant security problems. Long range planning must take this into account in order to provide additional security on a continuing basis.
- B. The ever increasing cost of guard protection of Agency buildings should be reduced through the use of technological advances in the field of personal identification. It is anticipated that by continuing effort, the state of the art in this field can be advanced so as to yield the desired security results. Automatic and instantaneous fingerprint processing is one of possibilities toward the achievement of this security goal.

## III. Counterintelligence

Within the framework of the present world power structure, considerable emphasis in the security field has been given to the threats presented by the currently identified -- Communist oriented -- opposition. Security techniques, practices and procedures must be sensitive to any new penetration efforts on the part of other nations which may affect the security of the Agency. Necessary security measures must be developed on a timely basis in order to meet any new, developing threats. In cooperation with the CI Staff, DDP, necessary security measures must be developed on a timely basis in order to meet any new developing threats.

## IV. Polygraph

- A. There has been much congressional interest in connection with the use of the polygraph. In this connection, the validity of the polygraph has been challenged and is being carefully evaluated.

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- B. Appropriate research will be necessary in order to improve the security benefits which can be derived by stress measurements. It is felt that considerable advancement in the state of the art of the polygraph technique is possible.

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V. Industrial Security

Until the present time there has been little evidence of concerted opposition efforts to penetrate industrial facilities performing classified Government contracts. With the increased importance of technology in the intelligence field and with increased dependence by the intelligence community on industrial assistance, it is anticipated that opposition efforts in this connection will be materially increased. Future security policies, procedures and techniques must address themselves to this problem and produce the necessary security protection.

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In light of the ever increasing emphasis in the field of hostile audio surveillance evidenced by the "microphone finds" in the U. S. Embassies in Moscow and Warsaw, it is necessary to keep more and more counteraudio teams in the field. Inasmuch as the offensive efforts will have the benefit of advanced technological developments, the

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security threat will become even more pronounced in the future. It will be necessary for audio teams to be equipped with the most sophisticated detection equipment producible under the existing state of the art. Research and development must be aggressively pursued in order to cope with this security problem.

VII. Personnel Security

In order for the Agency to stay abreast of new developments in the intelligence field it will be necessary to process security clearances in large numbers on a continuing basis. Increased efforts on the part of the opposition to penetrate CIA will require a continuing vast expenditure of manpower in order to yield the necessary degree of personnel security. Additional emphasis will be required to carry out a current reinvestigation program of staff employees, consultants and contractor personnel.

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All Office of Security programs must be geared so as to accrue the greatest benefits from automation. The most serious problem is the development of systems for the easy and effective in-put of security data into a format which can be automated and retrieved at a later date, compatible with the needs of all Agency components involved.

IX. Protection of Intelligence

- A. "Leaks of information" will continue to pose a threat to the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Efforts to combat such disclosures must continue to be exercised through the USIB, with continued emphasis upon the realization that the cooperation of all departments and agencies will be required to produce the necessary degree of success in this security effort.



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- B. The degree of protection afforded classified information is only as strong as the lowest standards maintained within the recipient agencies. Recent revelations of espionage have shown that all agencies are affected by the penetration of any one community agency. CIA is, therefore, continually striving through the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board to develop uniform security criteria and standards for use by all member agencies in the intelligence community.

X. Recommendations

- A. That the broad problem in the conduct of personnel security investigations resulting from the impact of "invasion of privacy" sensitivity on the part of the ~~part of the~~ general public and private institutions be submitted to the Security Committee of USIB for study and recommendations.
- B. That CIA increase research and development for improvement of the polygraph instrument and its utilization in order to obtain the utmost benefits through this security aid in support of intelligence operations and activities.
- C. That the Security Committee of USIB promulgate uniform personnel and physical security practices and procedures in all areas wherein community intelligence activities and personnel are affected.

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SECURITY PROBLEMS - LONG RANGE PLANNING

The Office of Security is constantly striving to improve security in all of its fields. Technical developments, sociological change, and possible realignment of international forces will require changes in our security techniques and procedures. These unique problems must be met with a high degree of sophistication in the security field. Some of the future problems can be identified by manifestations appearing at this time. Others cannot. Accordingly, this paper will address itself to future security problems which are either with us at the present time and will continue to be problems, or those which can be anticipated with some degree of certainty.

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22/1I. Investigations and Operational Support

1. As a result of recent writings on the "invasion of privacy" there has developed a noticeable reluctance on the part of persons interviewed during the course of investigations to furnish information about, or even identify, the persons known to them who are being investigated. This reluctance has also manifested itself in the refusal by some university officials to make available documents and information pertinent to personnel security investigations. It is contemplated that this will be a continuing problem which will become even more pronounced in future years. These circumstances will require the development of new investigative techniques and additional sources of information. In this regard, the Office of Security has a senior officer working on a classified book on this subject. This is being done in collaboration with the Brookings Institute through the medium of a one year fellowship.

2. The conduct of inter-agency name checks will, in the future, be made through the medium of automatic data processing equipment. This anticipated development will require long range planning on the part of the Office of Security in order that we may reap the benefits from such automated developments, but at the same time protect the security of Agency information and sources.

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## II. Physical Security

1. The physical protection of CIA installations and personnel abroad will be a continuing problem. The prominent power position of the U. S. will continue to subject its overseas personnel to increased numbers of demonstrations, riots, or acts of violence together with their attendant security problems. Long range planning must take this into account in order to provide additional security on a continuing "in-place" basis.

2. The ever increasing cost of guard protection of Agency buildings should be reduced through the use of technological advances in the field of personal identification. It is anticipated that by continuing effort, the state of the art in this field can be advanced so as to yield the desired security results. Automatic and instantaneous fingerprint processing is one of possibilities toward the achievement of this security goal.

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## IV. Polygraph

1. There has been much congressional interest in connection with the use of the polygraph. In this connection, the validity of the polygraph has been challenged and certain restrictions on its use are highly probable. Every effort must be made to permit the Agency to continue the use of this highly effective security asset.

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2. . Appropriate research will be necessary in order to improve the security benefits which can be derived by stress measurements. It is felt that considerable advancement in the state of the art of the polygraph technique is possible.

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Addendum to

PG-D-22/1

22 Aug 65

Security Problems in Long-Range Planning

Summary

1. Maintenance of adequate CIA security program is made difficult by:

- a. Increased requirements for U. S. personnel, industrial and physical security.
- b. Growing capabilities of opposition forces to penetrate U. S. security, particularly with technical devices.
- c. The proliferation of U. S. security organizations and difficulty of access to the great amounts of data held in separate repositories.
- d. The rising sentiment in the country to protect the privacy of the individual manifested by a reluctance to provide security investigators with required information and public reaction against the use of polygraph.

2. To meet these challenges the Agency will place special emphasis on the following:

- a. Development of new investigative techniques and additional sources of information.
- b. Continued use and improvement of the polygraph.

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- c. Research and development in improvements  
for and against technical surveillance.
- d. The use of automatic data processing techniques  
in the handling of security information within the Agency and  
the community.

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All Office of Security programs must be geared so as to accrue the greatest benefits from automation. The most serious problem is the development of systems for the easy and effective in-put of security data into a format which can be automated and retrieved at a later date. This includes counterintelligence information, summaries of case files, polygraph information and data in all other fields of security. The Office of Security must participate in Agency and community-wide efforts for maximum exploitation of security and counterintelligence information in the Intelligence Community.

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